Paul Boghossian - Research

Books

New Essays on Normative Realism (edited, with Christopher Peacocke), Oxford University Press, 2025.

Classical Music: Contemporary Perspectives and Challenges (edited, with Michael Beckerman), Open Book Publishers, 2021.

Debating the A Priori (with Timothy Williamson), Oxford University Press, 2020.

Content and Justification: Philosophical Papers, Oxford University Press, 2008.

Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism, Oxford University Press, 2006.

New Essays on the A Priori (edited, with Christopher Peacocke), Oxford University Press, 2000.

Articles

A Priori

“The Significance of A Priori Justification,” in B. Roeber, E. Sosa, M. Steup, & J. Turri (eds.): Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd Edition (Wiley-Blackwell, 2024), pp. 183-190.
“Do We Have Reason to Doubt the Importance of the Distinction between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge? A Reply to Williamson,” in Debating the A Priori (Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 137-155.
“Williamson on the Distinction between the A Priori and the A Posteriori Once Again,” in Debating the A Priori (Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 168-174.
“Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori,” in Debating the A Priori (Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 186-207.
“Reply to Williamson on Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori,” in Debating the A Priori (Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 214-226.
“Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82(2), 2011, pp. 488-497.
“Introduction,” (with Christopher Peacocke) in P. Boghossian & C. Peacocke (eds.): New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 1-10.

Aesthetics

“The Perception of Music: Comments on Peacocke,” The British Journal of Aesthetics, 50(1), 2010, pp. 71-76.
“On Music Reproduction,” Inner-World Audio, January 2009, pp. 34-35.
“Explaining Musical Experience,” in K. Stock (ed.): Philosophers on Music: Experience, Meaning, and Work (Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 117-129.
“On Hearing the Music in the Sound: Scruton on Musical Expression,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 60(1), 2002, pp. 49-55.

Analyticity

“Postscript: Further Thoughts about Analyticity, 20 Years Later,” in B. Hale, C. Wright, & A. Miller (eds.): A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, 2nd Edition (John Wiley & Sons, 2017), pp. 611-618.
“Epistemic Analyticity: A Defense,” Grazer Philosophische Studien, 66(1), 2003, pp. 13-35.
“Analyticity,” in B. Hale & C. Wright (eds.): A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (Blackwell, 1997), pp. 331-368.
“Analyticity Reconsidered,” Noûs, 30(3), 1996, pp. 360-391.
“Inferential Role Semantics and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction,” Philosophical Studies, 73(2-3), 1994, pp. 109-122.
“Analyticity and Conceptual Truth,” Philosophical Issues, 5(1), 1994, pp. 117-131.
“Cognitive Science and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction: Comments on Horwich,” Philosophical Issues, 3(1), 1993, pp. 135-142.

Color

“Physicalist Theories of Color,” (with David Velleman) The Philosophical Review, 100(1), 1991, pp. 67-106.
“Colour as a Secondary Quality,” (with David Velleman) Mind, 98(389), 1989, pp. 81-103.

Content

“The Normativity of Meaning Revisited,” in B. Dunaway & D. Plunkett (eds.): Meaning, Decision, and Norms: Themes from the Work of Allan Gibbard (Maize, 2022), pp. 389-401.
“Is (Determinate) Meaning a Naturalistic Phenomenon?,” in S. Gross, N. Tebben, & M. Williams (eds.): Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 331-358.
“Reply to Otero's “Boghossian’s Inference Argument against Content Externalism Reversed”,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89(1), 2014, pp. 182-184.
“Our Grasp of the Concept of Truth: Reflections on Künne,” Dialectica, 64(4), 2010, pp. 553-563.
“Is Meaning Normative?,” in C. Nimtz & A. Beckermann (eds.): Philosophy-Science-Scientific Philosophy, Main Lectures and Colloquia of GAP.5 (Mentis, 2005).
“The Normativity of Content,” Philosophical Issues, 13(1), 2003, pp. 31-45.
“Content,” in E. Sosa & J. Kim (eds.): A Companion to Metaphysics (Blackwell, 1995), pp. 94-96.
“The Transparency of Mental Content,” Philosophical Perspectives, 8, 1994, pp. 33-50.
“Does an Inferential Role Semantics Rest Upon a Mistake?,” Mind & Language, 8(1), 1993, pp. 27-40.
“Externalism and Inference,” Philosophical Issues, 2(1), 1992, pp. 11-28.
“Reply to Schiffer,” Philosophical Issues, 2(1), 1992, pp. 39-42.
“Naturalizing Content,” in B. Loewer & G. Rey (eds.): Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics (Blackwell, 1991), pp. 65-86.
“The Status of Content Revisited,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 71(4), 1990, pp. 264-278.
“The Status of Content,” The Philosophical Review, 99(2), 1990, pp. 157-184.
“Content and Self-Knowledge,” Philosophical Topics, 17(1), 1989, pp. 5-26.

Epistemic Justification

“Epistemic Rules,” The Journal of Philosophy, 105(9), 2008, pp. 472-500.
“Blind Reasoning,” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 77(1), 2003, pp. 225-248.
“How Are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?,” Philosophical Studies, 106(1-2), 2001, pp. 1-40.

Genocide

“The Concept of Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research, 12(1-2), 2010, pp. 69-80.
“Response to My Critics,” Journal of Genocide Research, 12(1-2), 2010, pp. 105-112.

Inference

“Logic and Reasoning,” (with Gideon Rosen) in F. Ferrari, E. Brendel, M. Carrara, O. Hjortland, G. Sagi, G. Sher, & F. Steinberger (eds.): Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
“Inference, Agency, and Responsibility,” in M. B. Jackson & B. B. Jackson (eds.): Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking (Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 101-124.
“Delimiting the Boundaries of Inference,” Philosophical Issues, 28(1), 2018, pp. 55-69.
“Reasoning and Reflection: A Reply to Kornblith,” Analysis, 76(1), 2016, pp. 41-54.
“Rationality, Reasoning and Rules: Reflections on Broome’s Rationality Through Reasoning,” Philosophical Studies, 173(12), 2016, pp. 3385-3397.
“What is Inference?,” Philosophical Studies, 169(1), 2014, pp. 1-18.
“Reply to Otero's “Boghossian’s Inference Argument against Content Externalism Reversed”,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89(1), 2014, pp. 182-184.
“Inference and Insight,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63(3), 2001, pp. 633-640.
“Externalism and Inference,” Philosophical Issues, 2(1), 1992, pp. 11-28.

Intuition

“Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori,” in Debating the A Priori (Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 186-207.
“Reply to Williamson on Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori,” in Debating the A Priori (Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 214-226.
“Intuitions and the Understanding,” in M. A. Fernández Vargas (ed.): Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 137-150.
“Seemings: Sensory and Intellectual,” in A. Benedek & K. Nyíri (eds.): Beyond Words: Pictures, Parables, Paradoxes (Peter Lang, 2015), pp. 203-208.
“Philosophy Without Intuitions? A Reply to Cappelen,” Analytic Philosophy, 55(4), 2014, pp. 368-381.
“Virtuous Intuitions: Comments on Lecture 3 of Ernest Sosa’s “A Virtue Epistemology”,” Philosophical Studies, 144(1), 2009, pp. 111-119.

Meaning

“The Problem of Meaning in the later Wittgenstein,” in A. H. Khani & G. Kemp (eds.): Wittgenstein and Other Philosophers (Routledge, forthcoming).

Philosophy of Logic

“Logic and Reasoning,” (with Gideon Rosen) in F. Ferrari, E. Brendel, M. Carrara, O. Hjortland, G. Sagi, G. Sher, & F. Steinberger (eds.): Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
“Kripke, Quine, the ‘Adoption Problem’ and the Empirical Conception of Logic,” (with Crispin Wright) Mind, 133(529), 2024, pp. 86-116.
“Knowledge of Logic,” in P. Boghossian & C. Peacocke (eds.): New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 229-254.

Relativism

“Establishing Moral Norms by Convention: Comments on Baghramian’s and Coliva’s Relativism,” Analysis, 82(3), 2022, pp. 506-513.
“La réalité telle qu'elle est, en soi,” in E. Alloa & É. During (eds.): Choses en soi: métaphysique du réalisme (PUF, 2018), pp. 271-281.
“Relativism about Morality,” in C. Kanzian, S. Kletzl, J. Mitterer, & K. Neges (eds.): Realism—Relativism—Constructivism: Proceedings of the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg (De Gruyter, 2017), pp. 301-312.
“Is Comparative Philosophy Based Upon a Mistake? A Reply to Ganeri’s ›Re:emergent Philosophy‹,” Confluence: Journal of World Philosophies, 4, 2016, pp. 149-153.
“Reply to Amini and Caldwell, “Boghossian’s Refutation of Relativism”,” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2(1), 2012, pp. 45-49.
“The Maze of Moral Relativism,” (The Stone) The New York Times, July 24, 2011.
“Three Kinds of Relativism,” in S. Hales (ed.): A Companion to Relativism (John Wiley & Sons, 2011), pp. 53-69.
“Epistemic Relativism,” in S. Bernecker & D. Pritchard (eds.): The Routledge Companion to Epistemology (Routledge, 2010), pp. 75-83.
“Précis of Fear of Knowledge,” Philosophical Studies, 141(3), 2008, pp. 377-378.
“Replies to Wright, MacFarlane and Sosa,” Philosophical Studies, 141(3), 2008, pp. 409-432.
“The Case Against Epistemic Relativism: Replies to Rosen and Neta,” Episteme, 4(1), 2007, pp. 49-65.
“What is Relativism?,” in P. Greenough & M. Lynch (eds.): Truth and Realism (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 13-37.
“Constructivist and Relativist Conceptions of Knowledge in Contemporary (Anti-)Epistemology: A Reply to Barbara Herrnstein Smith,” South Atlantic Quarterly, 101(1), 2002, pp. 213-227.
“What is Social Construction?,” The Times Literary Supplement, February 2001, pp. 6-8.
“What the Sokal hoax ought to teach us,” The Times Literary Supplement, December 1996, pp. 14-15.

Rule-following

“The Problem of Meaning in the later Wittgenstein,” in A. H. Khani & G. Kemp (eds.): Wittgenstein and Other Philosophers (Routledge, forthcoming).
“Kripke, Quine, the ‘Adoption Problem’ and the Empirical Conception of Logic,” (with Crispin Wright) Mind, 133(529), 2024, pp. 86-116.
“Rules, Norms and Principles: A Conceptual Framework,” in M. Araszkiewicz, P. Banaś, T. Gizbert-Studnicki, & K. Płeszka (eds.): Problems of Normativity, Rules and Rule-Following (Springer Verlag, 2015), pp. 3-11.
“What is Inference?,” Philosophical Studies, 169(1), 2014, pp. 1-18.
“Blind Rule-Following,” in A. Coliva (ed.): Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 27-48.
“Epistemic Rules,” The Journal of Philosophy, 105(9), 2008, pp. 472-500.
“Is Meaning Normative?,” in C. Nimtz & A. Beckermann (eds.): Philosophy-Science-Scientific Philosophy, Main Lectures and Colloquia of GAP.5 (Mentis, 2005).
“The Rule-Following Considerations,” Mind, 98(392), 1989, pp. 507-549.

Self-knowledge

“Further Thoughts on the Transparency of Mental Content,” in Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.): Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays (Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 97-112.
“The Transparency of Mental Content Revisited,” Philosophical Studies, 155(3), 2011, pp. 457-465.
“What the Externalist Can Know a Priori,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 97(1), 1997, pp. 161-176.
“The Transparency of Mental Content,” Philosophical Perspectives, 8, 1994, pp. 33-50.
“Content and Self-Knowledge,” Philosophical Topics, 17(1), 1989, pp. 5-26.

Book Reviews

“Review of Gillian Russell, Truth in Virtue of Meaning,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89(2), 2011, pp. 370-374.
“Review of Mark Richard, When Truth Gives Out,” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2010(5), 2010.
“Rules, Meaning and Intention: Discussion [Review of Philip Pettit, Rules, Meaning and Norms],” Philosophical Studies, 124(2), 2005, pp. 185-197.
“Seeking the Real [Review of Barry Stroud, The Quest for Reality],” Philosophical Studies, 108(1-2), 2002, pp. 223-238.
“Sense, Reference and Rule-Following [Review of Jerrold Katz, The Metaphysics of Meaning],” Philosophical Issues, 4(1), 1993, pp. 135-141.
“Review of Colin McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning,” The Philosophical Review, 98(1), 1989, pp. 83-92.